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Abstract: For more than 20 years, scholars have assessed a plan’s content to determine the plan’s
quality, with quality serving as a proxy for planning efficacy. However, scholars rarely examine the
relationship between a plan’s quality and the plan’s intended outcome. Thus, it is unclear whether
quality influences planning outcomes or even advances equity. To close this gap, this study assessed
a non-random sample of housing plans from 43 cities in California’s Los Angeles and Sacramento
regions to observe how cities accommodated low-income housing needs and to observe whether
each plan’s quality influenced low-income housing production. The analysis indicates that the plans
identified 42 different planning tools to accommodate low-income housing needs, and nearly 60% of
the implementing objectives proposed construction programs. Quality is influential after the city’s
location, land-use, population, and the plan’s compliance with state housing law are taken into
account. In summary, quality illuminated how these cities accommodated low-income housing needs
and, in conjunction with other city conditions, quality influences low-income housing production.
Due to this non-random sample, this study calls on planning scholars to subject quality to more
empirical tests on planning outcomes in other areas to increase quality’s importance in scholarship.
Keywords: low-income; housing; mandates; cities; California
1. Introduction
After more than 20 years of studies, is there any evidence indicating that a plan’s quality has any
influence on the plan’s intended outcome? Quality is a descriptive method that scholars use to assess
a plan’s content. Depending on the plan’s level of detail, scholars will assess the plan’s goals, facts,
and implementing policies, assign those items dichotomous (0, 1), ordinal (0, 1, 2), and/or interval
(0, . . . , n) values, and subsequently calculate an overall quality score. Plans with high scores are
promoted as high quality, with quality representing planning efficacy. However, what is often missing
from these studies is an analysis linking the plan’s quality with the plan’s intended outcome.
If a plan focused on mitigating environmental hazards (e.g., earthquakes, floods, or hurricanes)
and received a quality assessment, shouldn’t planning practitioners know whether the plan’s quality
might reduce physical damage or mortality? Similarly, if a plan focused on implementing smart
growth, sustainability, or transportation, shouldn’t planning practitioners know whether the plan’s
quality might influence sprawl, vehicle miles travelled, and/or auto dependence? While quality
adroitly describes a plan’s content, quality’s influence on planning practice is debatable. Unlike
collaborative, communicative, incremental, and/or mediation approaches, as well as the breadth of
studies extolling scholars to improve plan quality discourse [1,2], there is no evidence to date that
planning practitioners consider quality an important planning approach. Perhaps this lack of evidence
is because scholars rarely test the influence of quality on outcomes, because to do so would require a
more stringent analysis [3].
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As a former planning practitioner, I suggest that quality scholars consider the concerns of
practitioners. Reflecting on Baer’s research on plan evaluation, quality has been a discussion only
among scholars [4] (p. 332). To include practitioners, the quality scholars must focus on the object
that is central to many planning functions, the reduction of uncertainty in future outcomes [5]. This
shift in discourse means that the quality scholars must begin to systematically test the influence of
quality on plans’ intended outcomes. If scholars find that quality influences outcomes, then I suggest
that quality should be positioned as a method for assessing plans during plan creation, not post-hoc [6].
Currently, quality scholars assess plans after the horses have left the gate. By shifting quality to draft
plan assessments, planning practitioners may improve a final plan’s intent, content, and outcomes.
If quality is found to have no influence after many studies, then how should this discourse relate
to planning practice? Scholars can quantify how quality has filled many journals, populated many
conference sessions, and graduated many doctoral students. However, quality gives short shrift to the
field’s foundation: planners and their efforts to reduce uncertainty in future outcomes [7].
In this paper, I have two aims: to explore whether quality influences a plan’s intended outcome
and whether quality advances equity. As mentioned previously, much of the quality discourse focuses
on natural hazards or the environment. These are areas in which federal, state, and local agencies
share congruent interests to reduce physical damage and human mortality [8]. With low-income
housing, however, tensions arise among those agencies as well as between planners, city councils,
and residents [9]. Furthermore, due to decreased government budgets and increasing needs, planning
scholars and practitioners should move toward planning outcomes that promote equity and provide
material wellbeing [10]. To achieve my aims, I assess the quality of housing plans from cities in
California’s Los Angeles and Sacramento regions.
Since 1969, California’s Housing Element Law has required all cities to create a housing plan
that details how each city will accommodate its current and future low-income housing needs. These
housing plans contain goals, facts, and objectives; identify households by income; establish how
many low-income housing units are expected to be constructed during a five- to eight-year period;
and undergo a state compliance assessment. Conceivably, California and its city planners expect
that the effort embedded in these housing plans will increase the housing options for low-income
households. Thus, there are two research questions: How do cities from the Los Angeles and
Sacramento regions accommodate low-income housing needs? Does the quality of a city’s housing
plan influence the city’s low-income housing production?
The assessment of housing plans from 43 cities indicated that planners employed 42 different
planning tools to accommodate low-income housing needs, and nearly 60% of the objectives facilitated
low-income housing with construction programing. However, roughly 52% of the objectives could
not be effectively evaluated because those objectives specified ongoing outcomes (e.g., continuing
to refer households to fair-housing agencies) as opposed to quantifiable outcomes (e.g., constructing
10 low-income units in 5 years). Regarding quality, this study employed three measures of quality
to represent three interpretations of the Housing Element Law (i.e., narrow, wide, and widest).
Independently, quality was not associated with low-income housing production. When tested with
other variables, the quality of the housing plan influenced low-income housing production after the
city’s location, land-use, population, and the plan’s compliance with state housing law were taken into
account. Because this study employs a non-random sample, these inferences are limited to the sample.
Following this introduction is background on quality and California’s Housing Element Law.
The subsequent literature review analyzes research on housing plans and their influence on low-income
housing. The methods section explains transforming housing plan content into reliable test data.
The results section discusses how cities from the Los Angeles and Sacramento regions accommodated
low-income housing needs and whether the quality of the housing plans from these cities influenced
low-income housing production. Lastly, the discussion section calls on planning scholars to increase
the influence of quality. In the quality discourse, scholars use the terms quality and plan quality
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interchangeably; however, this paper will use quality. In addition, the Housing Element Law will be
referenced as the law and compliance means that a housing plan complies with a state law.
2. Background
2.1. Quality
What is quality? In planning, quality is a method with which scholars assess a plan’s content
against an organized and subjective criteria that epitomizes planning theory or implements best
practices [2] (p. 433). To complete a quality assessment, a scholar completes the following procedures.
First, a scholar (or the initial coder) creates a protocol that lists specific items that are pertinent to
understanding the phenomena. The items assessed are usually a plan’s facts, goals, and implementing
policies. Second, depending on the plan’s level of detail, the scholar scores each item with zero if the
item was not present in the plan, one if the item was present but lacked detail, or two if the item was
present and detailed. Third, the scholar sums the item totals and then assigns the plan an overall
quality score. The plan’s score determines if it was considered high- or low-quality. To increase the
reliability of the protocol and the validity of the scholar’s analysis, many (but not all) scholars enlist a
second coder who also assesses either a sample or all of the plans in question. With a second coder,
the reliability and validity of the overall analysis can be measured by percentage agreement or by
probability (e.g., Cohen’s kappa, Krippendorff’s alpha), with the latter preferred. The scholar might
also submit the protocol to a scholarly review. Lastly, the scholar might interview planners in order to
triangulate the quality assessment.
In 1994 and after the award of an NSF grant, a team of scholars completed the first series of studies
that assessed the quality of comprehensive plans as they related to natural hazards (e.g., Philip Berke
at Texas A & M University; Raymond Burby at the University of New Orleans; Linda Dalton at
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo; John DeGrove and Susan Trevarthen at the Florida Atlantic University;
Steven French at the Georgia Institute of Technology; Edward Kaiser and Dale Roenigk at the University
of North Carolina; and Peter J. May at the University of Washington). Using a natural experiment
that compared mandate states (i.e., requires a plan) to non-mandate states, the cities adhering to
coercive mandates (i.e., penalties) produced more plans than non-mandate cities [11]. Cities adhering
to comprehensive mandates (e.g., imposes deadlines, guidelines, and/or regulations) produced plans
of higher quality than non-mandate cities [12]. Mandates that enhanced a city’s planning capacity (e.g.,
provides technical assistance and/or grants) led to high quality plans [13]. However, coercive mandates
that reduced local autonomy may lead to “calculated commitments” to state goals, as evidenced by
Hoch’s finding of “mediocre” affordable housing plans in Illinois, for example [14] (p. 174), [15] (p. 96).
Because quality “is straightforward to understand and use” and maintains “low barriers to entry
as a research method,” many scholars embraced quality to explore natural hazards and environmental
planning [2] (p. 434; Table 1). Deyle and Smith, for example, focused on coastal storms to determine
whether mandates produce local-level plans that accomplish the goals of higher-level governments [8].
After examining 18 plans from Florida counties and cities, the authors found that those plans marginally
complied with the mandate (facts were 64% in compliance, goals were 50%, and policies were 48%).
Interviews revealed, however, that the state agency only evaluated a plan’s evacuation policies (one of
five topics) due to “political pressure and administrative capability,” leading to questions of plan and
agency effectiveness [8] (p. 462).
Brody integrated adaptive management with land-use to examine the quality of plans from
communities that are subject to repeated natural disasters [16]. Adaptive management emphasizes
learning from natural resource policy implementation and echoes Friedmann, who theorized
planning as a heuristic process in which planners and the planning process improve via transactive
experiences [17,18]. After assessing two waves of plans from Florida and Washington, Brody
determined that the plans’ overall quality had increased; however, the passage of Washington’s Growth
Management Act, which required compliant plans by 1994, may have intervened. Inferentially, Brody
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determined that a community’s 1991 plan quality was positively associated with the community’s
1999 plan quality, raising the issue of plans with templated content.
As the quality discourse gained stature, scholars extended the method to sustainability, smart
growth, and transportation plans. Regarding sustainability, Berke and Conroy gathered a national
sample of 30 plans and found no difference in the quality of plans organized with and without
sustainability concepts [19]. Furthermore, the sustainability plans promoted the attainment of a livable
built environment rather than promoting polluter penalties, regionalism, or equity. Regarding smart
growth, Edwards and Haines assessed 30 comprehensive plans and determined that Wisconsin’s
small cities and towns produced plans of low quality [20]. The authors rightly concluded that
smart growth’s urban focus on “compact, mixed use, and pedestrian-friendly” development might
overlook “stabilizing and revitalizing agriculturally based economies” [20] (pp. 61–62). However,
the authors did not assess Wisconsin’s mandate. If Edwards and Haines found the higher-order
mandate inconsistent with smart growth concepts, then it would follow that the lower-order plans
would be of questionable quality.
Regarding transportation, Jones, Evenson, Rodriguez, and Aytur assessed 46 voluntary pedestrian
and bicycle plans from North Carolina cities and counties [21]. The authors noted that high quality
plans shifted resources to match priorities, specified implementation timelines, identified funding,
and designated one person to manage implementation. However, cities with high quality plans
also had pedestrian injury rates that were higher than the state average. This last finding echoed
May and Burby, who found that voluntary plans may contain more innovative policies than mandated
plans, but, as a group, voluntary cities may be at a higher risk due to these cities’ lower commitment to
mitigate documented hazards [14].
As a discourse, quality’s contributions to planning scholarship are notable. Quality illuminates the
effect of mandates that require a plan response, and quality allows scholars to examine a community’s
planning and values. As advanced by Kaiser, Godschalk, and Chapman, a plan should establish
a community’s vision, communicate that vision to interested parties, and guide the decisions of
community leaders and planners [22]. However, the degree to which a plan complies with any mandate
may also depend on whether the community’s values align with the mandate’s goals, the mandate’s
parameters, and the planning department’s administrative capacity [13,23,24].
In planning education, and due to its roots in content analysis [25], quality can be taught in
all planning programs because it provides a qualitative counterbalance to quantitative instruction.
Quality also embeds planners in planning theory. As noted by Forester, who channeled Habermas,
a planner’s actions are attention shaping and may lead to a dialectic communication between planners
and the larger community [26]. A quality assessment describes what is and what is not in a plan and,
as a result, the plan’s content (or lack thereof) influences community discussions. Lastly, quality also
expands scholarly discourse. Because a plan is the unit of analysis and plans are produced in other
fields (e.g., biology, climate change, economic development), non-planning scholars can adapt the
method to assess their respective plans. However, quality’s relevance to planning is conditioned by
one’s definition of planning. Is planning a process or is it object-oriented [27]? In 1973, Wildavsky
defined planning as the “ability to control the future by current” actions, only to conclude that plans
are nothing more than a political acts of faith because “there is virtually no evidence that [plans] do
good” [5] (pp. 128, 151). In housing, one could examine the effects of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development’s (HUD) Section 701 planning assistance on urban renewal as evidence of
mixed outcomes [28–30].
After WW II, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949 to advance slum clearance with urban
renewal; however, a city could not receive slum clearance funds unless its urban renewal plan
conformed to its general plan [31,32], Title I, Section 105. Soon after, federal officials found that
small localities (25,000 persons or less) lacked housing and building codes that would guide federal
investments [33] (p. 179). In response, Congress added Section 701 to the Housing Act of 1954 to
increase the planning capacity of small cities by authorizing matching grants to states and cities for
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“planning assistance (surveys, land-use studies, urban renewal plans, technical services and other
planning work” [34]). By the late 1960s, Section 701 not only supported urban renewal, comprehensive,
and housing plans, but also a city’s planning efforts on behalf of the U.S. Departments of Commerce,
Interior, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Transportation, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, for example [35]. Similar to Wildavsky, Faludi viewed planning as future-oriented
but limited its purpose to only influencing an actor’s decision because the plan (and its implementation)
was “secondary in importance . . . . as [a plan] need not be followed at all” [6,36] (p. 129). Taking
the middle ground, Alexander defined planning as a deliberate strategy of future action that has
the power to implement the selected strategy that creates beneficial outcomes [7] (p. 137). In their
resolution of these divergent views, Alexander and Faludi suggested that planners adopt the lens of
conformance [36].
Conformance, which embraces uncertainty, requires that planners evaluate their actions using
five criteria that link the planning process (e.g., operational decisions, implementation decisions) with
planning outcomes (e.g., actual outputs, outcomes, and impacts) [36] (p. 135). To its credit, quality
does employ conformance, but it is only to a limited degree because the assessment of plan content
only illuminates the planning process. To be fair, not all mandates examined by quality engender a
tangible outcome. For example, California’s housing policy (to be discussed) and its seismic safety
policy are process-oriented endeavors [37,38]. Even still, if scholars do not link planning aims with
outcomes, then scholars eliminate feedback that allows planning practitioners to revise planning goals,
discussions, and implementation.
To their credit and in recent years, several studies have called for improvements to increase the
impact of quality in planning scholarship. In 2009, Berke and Godschalk analyzed the components
of sixteen quality studies and suggested improvements in inter-coder agreement, research design,
and protocol development. Rather than suggest that researchers examine planning outcomes,
the authors suggested that jurisdictions “require that planners conduct plan quality evaluation as
part” of a plan’s preparation and review [1] (p. 238, italics in the original.). In 2014, several papers
exhorted quality scholars to increase the validity and reliability of quality discourse by improving
the components of a quality study (e.g., protocol, scoring, coding, sampling, testing, and inter-coder
agreement; [2,39]. Notably, Lyles and Stevens called out that “the pool of studies linking plan quality
to planning outcomes is quite limited . . . . [and] this area represent a major gap . . . regarding the
empirical value of plans” [2] (p. 437); however, the authors did not suggest that scholars fill this gap
with empiricism. This is a gap that scholars can and should close. As such, quality, as a theoretical
model, remains uncultivated [27] (pp. 574–575).
2.2. California’s Housing Element Law
Since 1969, California requires that each city create a housing plan that details how the city
will accommodate its housing demand [40]. In the mid-1970s, California’s Department of Housing
and Community Development (CAHCD) initiated a fair-share scheme that has two purposes. First,
fair-share stratifies housing demand by low-income and market-rate housing needs. Second, it directs
where low-income housing “should be built within a region according to such criteria as placing
housing where it will expand housing opportunity” [41] (p. 1). Due to California’s high home
prices, low- and moderate-income households may earn 0–120% of the Area Median Income (AMI)
established by HUD [42]. The state also categorizes the disabled, farm workers, female-headed
households, the homeless, large families, and seniors as special needs households (SPN HH) that
require individual planning attention. Lastly, California declares that “housing affordable to low- and
moderate-income households requires the cooperation of all levels of government” [40] (§ 65580 (c)).
As a state mandate, the Housing Element Law operates in five general steps. First, every 5–8 years
CAHCD establishes California’s overall housing demand and then regionally apportions that demand
to the Councils of Governments (COGs). Second, the COGs create individual fair-share housing
allocations for each city (reflecting production capacity and housing needs) in order to equitably
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distribute low-income and market-rate housing needs. Third, planners incorporate the allocations
into their cities’ housing plans. Each housing plan will detail a city’s accommodation of low-income
housing needs in terms of construction (by specifying that the city contains enough appropriately
zoned land), rehabilitation (by specifying programs that remove deficient plumbing, electrical, and/or
structural issues), and/or preservation (by specifying programs that extend current subsidies). Fourth,
planners submit their housing plans to CAHCD, which determines whether the plans comply with
state law. Lastly and during the next cycle (time 2), planners evaluate the city’s housing efforts during
time 1. Depending on those results, the COG may modify a city’s fair-share housing allocation for
time 2.
Regarding plan content, California housing plans contain goals, policies, programs, and objectives.
Goals declare the “ultimate purpose of any effort stated in a manner that is general in nature,”
whereas policies impart “specific statement[s] guiding action and imply clear commitment” [43]
(p. 2). Programs categorize outcomes as the construction, rehabilitation, or preservation of housing.
Objectives implement a city’s commitments, as the objectives are the “action, procedure . . . or technique
that carries out policies” (Ibid). Objectives also employ various planning tools that may include
density bonuses, overlay zones, co-housing, mixed-use, increased density, and accessory dwellings.
Surprisingly, several housing plans promoted reverse mortgages as a planning tool for facilitating
aging-in-place for seniors [44] (p. H 74–75), [45] (p. 23), [46] (p. 94), [47] (p. C-58). Lastly, housing plans
must not only document a city’s quantity of the special needs households, but the plans must also
identify the specific goals, policies, programs, and objectives that accommodate this group’s housing
needs. The City of Wheatland provides an example of a city’s effort to accommodate low-income
housing needs [43] (p. 4).
Wheatland’s housing plan has four goals, one goal of which is to “provide for the city’s regional
share of new housing for all income groups” (ibid). This goal has seven policies, one of which
is, “The City shall work with other public agencies and private organizations to build affordable
housing” (ibid). This goal enacts construction, rehabilitation, and preservation programs and lists
13 objectives, one of which is, “The City shall redesignate and re-zone 4.1 acres of land for multi-family
use at 18 units per acre in order to accommodate at least an additional 73 multi-family units needed to
provide adequate sites for affordable housing” (ibid). California gives planners wide latitude regarding
whose efforts are documented in a plan’s objectives. The City of Winters, for example, included the
effort of the Yolo County Housing Authority in Winters’ objectives to preserve forty-four Section 8
vouchers [48] (pp. 17, 36). The City of Pasadena included housing owned by California’s Department
of Transportation in its objectives to preserve five hundred low-income units [49] (pp. 5, 29).
While California’s approach is laudable, it has limits. California has no provision that ensures
that sites identified for future low-income housing will remain low-income at permit issuance. During
any planning period, a city may not attain compliance until the final effective year or may thwart its
required low-income housing planning [50] (p. 504). There is no database of constructed, rehabilitated,
or preserved low-income units resulting from the law. Finally, California imposes no penalties.
Noncompliant cities may be subject to lawsuits from parties with legal standing [51,52]. Consequently,
the California League of Cities advises city attorneys to be “proactive in ensuring that their housing
[plan] can survive a legal challenge [by] preventing consultants and staff from making promises that
the city” cannot fulfill [53].
To understand housing plan efficacy, Baer argued that housing plans “have been used symbolically
both to arouse the polity and later lull it into continued political inaction” [54] (p. 172). Early 20th
century housing plans were calls to reform slum conditions [55]. During the 1950s and 1960s, HUD’s
Section 701 funds supported comprehensive and housing plans that employed technical analyses
to quantify needs and demand [31,33]. In the late 1970s, HUD allowed planners to implement
regional allocation systems after recognizing that uncoordinated municipal responses could not reduce
housing inequity [56]. California aspires to this final iteration. However, neither California’s fair-share
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housing allocations nor compliance consistently produce low-income housing for one simple reason:
local autonomy.
The law’s central problem is determining which agency (e.g., CAHCD, COGs, or cities) arbitrates
density. Baer attributes this problem to governance [57]. With passage of AB 2853 in 1980, California
shifted its housing laws from hierarchal command to governance—all agencies operate as equal
actors [58] (pp. 59–61). Even though the housing allocation directs changes in density in order to
promote equity, a city may resist modifying a neighborhood’s established character [59,60]. Baer
acknowledged that compliance advances equitable planning, but also lamented that there is little
evidence indicating that compliance produces “affordable units on actual building sites” [58] (p. 68).
In closing, the presented study will attempt to link planning aims to planning outcomes by exploring
the relationship between the quality of housing plans and low-income housing production—the plan’s
intended outcome and also an equitable good.
3. Literature Review
This review focuses on housing mandates and their influence on low-income housing production.
The foundation for many of these mandates is a fair-share scheme that allows low-income households
to find suitable housing within a region. New Jersey and Massachusetts are two states with notable
fair-share schemes [61–63]. What makes these states different from California is that their plans are not
interventions. For example, Massachusetts requires that at least 10% of a city’s housing inventory is
affordable to low-income households. However, Massachusetts does not mandate that cities maintain
comprehensive or housing plans to facilitate low-income housing production. Therefore, how a city
achieves and maintains its low-income housing inventory is largely left to each city and its planners.
This review focuses on those mandates in which the plan is the intervention. A review of the literature
indicates that few housing studies adopt a quality approach to examine housing mandates and few
studies examine low-income housing units as the outcome of the planning process. This review first
discusses housing studies that examined the planning process and then discusses housing studies that
examined low-income housing as the planning outcome.
3.1. Housing Mandates and the Planning Process in Florida, Illinois, and Georgia
In 1985, Florida’s Growth Management Act (GMA) required that cities adopt comprehensive
plans (with required housing plans) to accomplished three state goals: anticipate future housing,
address blight, and identify future housing sites. Florida evaluates the plans for compliance but
does not pursue fair-share. Consequently, the cities “establish[ed] their own definition of housing
need” [64] (p. 70). In 1993, Connerly and Muller analyzed five county and five city housing plans to
determine whether GMA would “stimulate local planning responsibility for affordable housing” [65]
(p. 186). Using a seven-component protocol that consisted of planning and public administration
best practices, the authors gave the plans low scores because the plans “lack[ed] the specificity and
comprehensiveness that are required to adequately address” Florida’s low-income housing crisis [65]
(p. 196). However, their protocol included items not specified by Florida’s law, reducing its validity.
Ten years later, Anthony examined the influence of GMA on housing affordability in sixty-seven
Florida counties [66]. After examining 16 years of data, Anthony found that households in counties
with compliant housing plans could not afford homes priced at the county’s median sales price unless
those households spent more than 25% of their household income. Anthony also found that increases
in a county’s population was strongly associated with decreased housing affordability, more people
chasing fewer units.
In 2014, Aurand gathered a random sample of two waves of housing plans from 39 Florida
cities to assess each housing plan’s strength and then tested whether that strength influenced housing
affordability [67]. Aurand operationalized strength by creating a protocol that listed 20 planning
policies for facilitating low-income housing (as suggested by Florida’s housing agency) and then
enumerated how many of those policies were found in a housing plan (maximum score = 20). After
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employing a second coder to increase his validity, Aurand found that the median number of affordable
housing policies increased from 3 per plan to 5 per plan, with working with the public housing
authority, expending Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, and increasing density as
the top three policies. Inferentially, Aurand found that the strength of housing plans from 1988–1993
was not influential, but the strength of housing plans from 1996–2004 was associated with decreases
in cost-burdened homeowners and increases in low-priced rental units. Due to the strength’s lagged
significance, Aurand suggested that Florida’s robust housing market and available state subsidies
might have influenced housing affordability. However, Aurand may have over-specified his model,
as he employed 14 predicting variables on 39 observations. In summary, Florida reinforces the planning
process, does not define low-income housing needs, and lacks housing production data. Overall, these
studies indicate that Florida’s initial plans marginally accommodated low-income housing needs, but a
plan’s quantity of affordable policies increased over time. However, compliance in Florida may signal
two conditions: a successful planning process and households in the midst of a housing crisis.
In 1961, Illinois allowed cities to adopt voluntary comprehensive plans [68]. Regarding housing
equity, Illinois passed the Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act (AHPAA) in 2004, which
requires cities to create affordable housing plans if more than 10% of a city’s housing inventory is
not affordable to low- and moderate-income households [69]. Similar in approach to Connerly and
Mueller [65], Hoch assessed housing plans in 2007 to examine the plans’ consistency with the AHPAA
and commitment to low-income housing. After analyzing 36 plans that missed the AHPAA’s initial
deadline, Hoch found that 83% were internally consistent with the AHPAA, 47% contained information
relevant to local conditions, but only 14% documented a local commitment to low-income housing.
A key issue was a city’s declaration of home rule. Many cities, mistakenly or not, claimed the AHPAA
did not apply to them. In summary, Illinois enacts fair-share, compiles housing data, but renders
comprehensive planning as voluntary. In fact, four laws differently define comprehensive planning:
the Local Resources Management Planning Act of 2002, the Local Planning Technical Assistance Act of
2002, the Local Legacy Act of 2004, and the initial 1961 law in Chapter 65, ILCS 5/11-12-7. Regarding
the analysis, Hoch illuminated the planning process but did not provide a protocol that guided his
analysis (limiting replication). Citing a lack of resources, he did not employ a second coder (weakening
the accuracy of the analysis). Regarding low-income housing production, Hoch evaluated the Illinois
mandate in its early years; however, in the ensuing years there should be evidence of AHPAA’s influence
on low-income housing production because Illinois enumerates each city’s housing inventory and
whether the city has produced an affordable housing plan [70].
In 1989, Georgia mandated comprehensive plans for all cities and began reviewing the plans for
compliance. However, a housing plan is required only if the city receives CDBG funds from HUD.
Furthermore, a CDBG city may substitute its HUD-consolidated plan for the required housing plan.
Regarding housing equity, Georgia does not issue fair-share targets but encourages cities to consider
the following: cost-burdened households, impacts of housing affordability, and jobs/housing balance,
for example. In 2017, Jun compared the strength of affordable housing policies in Atlanta region
comprehensive plans to the strength of plans from the Detroit region and then tested the relationship
between strength and housing affordability. To determine strength, Jun expanded Aurand’s protocol
to 23 affordable housing policies, giving 1 point for voluntary policies (e.g., encourage, consider,
should), and 2 points for mandatory policies (e.g., shall, will, require), for a maximum quality score of
46 points [3] (p. 255). After assessing 58 plans, Jun found that Georgia plans were stronger (=4.9) than
Michigan plans (=1.82).
Regarding housing affordability, strength was positively associated with the growth of
cost-burdened renters and homeowners in both locations. Like Anthony [66], Jun found that a
successful planning process may also signal households experiencing a housing crisis. In summary,
Georgia mandates comprehensive planning, but HUD may actually dictate housing equity for
Georgia residents. Regarding Jun’s analysis, three issues are unclear. First, Jun assessed plans from
the Detroit region to approximate a natural experiment in which a scholar examines the contrast
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between a treatment and comparison condition [71] (pp. 12, 17). Because Michigan does not require
comprehensive plans or provides any guidance on housing equity [72], was the Detroit region a
suitable comparison or simply a straw man? Second, Jun did not identify the sample cities nor clarify
if the strength analysis examined housing plans or consolidated plans. This identification would
have indicated if the city or HUD directed local housing policy. Lastly, Jun justly modified Aurand’s
protocol to fit the research aims but, like Hoch, did not employ additional coders to provide inter-coder
reliability. Without clarification, these three conditions reduce the impact of this study.
3.2. Housing Mandates and Housing Outcomes in California and Minnesota
Regarding the influence of California’s Housing Element Law, Lewis regressed the 1994
compliance of 354 municipalities on their 1994–2000 residential permit data and determined
that population, household income, and job/worker ratio, not compliance, influenced housing
production [73]. While notable, Lewis could not identify low-income housing because he relied on
permit data. Recently, Ramsey-Musolf examined a purposive sample of Los Angeles and Sacramento
region cities (1990–2007, n = 53) and determined that compliant cities were associated with a
2.3% increase in low-income housing production (as identified by the housing plans) relative to
noncompliant municipalities [50]. In contrast, compliant municipalities were associated with a −0.22%
decrease in annual housing production (i.e., permits) relative to noncompliant municipalities. While
these findings suggest that California operates with conflicting goals, these associations are limited to
the sample. Regarding the analysis in both studies, neither Lewis nor Ramsey-Musolf could establish a
counterfactual because all cities must adhere to state policy and no pre-test data exists [71]. In summary,
California advances a complex planning process to achieve housing equity. However, scholars are
limited in their examination of California’s housing mandate due to the persistent lack of data.
In, 1967, Minnesota established the Metropolitan Council (Council) to coordinate the planning
and development of the seven-county Minneapolis and St. Paul region [74]. By 1976, Minnesota
passed the Land-Use Planning Act (LUPA) to mandate comprehensive planning for cities located in
the region and to grant the Council compliance authority [75]. Regarding housing equity, the Council
established an advisory committee that recommended that comprehensive plans “identify sufficient
land to accommodate the communities’ share of the region’s need for low- and moderate-income
housing” [76] (p. 2). In 2003, Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann examined three waves of plans from
25 cities and found that the 1975–1982 plans facilitated low-income housing by employing nearly
four policies per plan [77]. For example, 75% of plans relied on Planned Unit Development (PUD)
designations, 58% relied on increasing density, 58% relied on reducing minimum unit sizes, and,
fiscally, only 8% relied on tax increment funding. A PUD, when approved by a zoning board or city
council, allows current and future development to deviate from the city’s zoning regulations [78].
For post-1995 plans, those plans employed nearly two policies per plan, with PUDs identified in 56%
of the plans.
Regarding the persistence of high-density land, Goetz et al. argued that cities significantly reduced
their exposure to potential low-income housing because only 22% of the original parcels persisted.
Specifically, the cities rezoned 38% of high-density parcels to lower densities and 17% to non-residential
uses. Regarding actual production, there was no data verifying whether low-income housing was
constructed on the parcels. Goetz et al. blamed not only the council but also HUD for failing to hold
cities accountable. HUD’s Section 701 funds supported council activities. Therefore, when Section
701 (and the A-95 circular) ceased, the council and its management of fair-share and comprehensive
planning also ceased [79]. In summary, Minnesota mandated comprehensive planning, evaluated
plans for compliance, pursued an equitable outcome via high-density land, and employed PUDs to
facilitate low-income housing. However, less than 25% of land set aside for low-income housing
persisted. While innovative because they diverge from Euclidean zoning, PUDs can also be employed
as an exclusionary tool. In the 1960s, PUDs were hailed as flexible zoning tools for cities to use when
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regulating complex projects; however, PUDs were frequently transformed into negotiated contracts
between developers and elected officials without the input of residents [78] (p. 11).
In summary, the planning process research illuminated how states emphasize creating plans
and policies that aspire to increase low-income housing production. The housing outcomes research
indicated that the planning process may or may not have any relationship with housing production.
However, scholars and planners cannot champion planning reform without evidence of the impact of
the planning process on outcomes. Furthermore, two interrelated issues hamper gathering evidence:
the state mandates and data. First, none of the examined mandates specified that a housing unit
was the ultimate measure of a mandate’s success. Because states evaluate the compliance of plans
and not the construction of housing, they have little incentive to document housing production and
consequently create data. Thus, several scholars examined permit data, housing affordability, and the
strength of housing policies as proxies for low-income housing units. To reform state housing policy,
what is needed is scholarship that evaluates the planning process and planning outcomes, a gap that
the presented study attempts to close.
4. Methods and Data
To determine whether quality influences planning outcomes and advances equity, this study has
two research questions. How do cities from the Los Angeles and Sacramento regions accommodate
low-income housing needs? Does the quality of a city’s housing plan influence the city’s low-income
housing production? The following discussion, as guided by Lyles and Stevens, explains this study’s
context, research design, sampling, units of analysis, protocol, scoring, and analysis [2].
Contextually, the Housing Element Law embodies California’s planning doctrine. Since 1947,
all California cities and counties must maintain a general plan [80]. Since 1969, all general plans must
contain a housing plan. A city’s or county’s zoning code must maintain vertical consistency with its
general plan, meaning daily zoning actions advance the general plan’s long-term goals [81]. Thus, if a
city or county adopts a compliant housing plan, then the housing plan’s objectives should satisfy local
housing demand, regional fair-share, and California’s goal of housing equity. However, this study
focuses on cities and not counties because their respective planning processes are non-equivalent,
as California counties manage vast tracts or scatter fragments of unincorporated land. In addition,
Lobao and Kraybill found that county planning was associated with urban development—with
outer-ring and rural counties having fewer funds available for housing and economic activities [82].
This study employed a cross-sectional research design to assess housing plans that were effective
from 1998–2005. This period captures California’s path to its apex of housing plan compliance 90% in
2010 [83]. Figure A1 illustrates the compliance performance of California and the sample.
The purposive sample of 43 cities was guided by the Housing Element Law’s compliance
procedures and each city’s character. The law requires all cities to accommodate current and future
housing demand, and the most direct method for obtaining compliance and facilitating housing
production is for a city to identify parcels of vacant land or parcels that will support increased
density. In California, cities surrounded by unincorporated land may annex adjacent vacant parcels
for future development, as those parcels may fall under the city’s “sphere of influence.” According
to the California law, a sphere of influence “designates the physical boundaries and service area
of a city or special district” [84] (p. 2). California cities may control the land-use and zoning of
unincorporated land that is adjacent to city boundaries and subject to future annexation. In contrast,
cities contiguous with other cities must increase their internal density with zone changes, density
bonuses, or inclusionary housing, for example. The sample (n = 43) includes spatially contiguous and
non-contiguous cities from the Los Angeles and Sacramento regions.
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Figure 1. The Los Angeles Region Subset. These cities are located in Los Angeles County and include
the City of Los Angeles plus 27 cities in the San Gabriel Valley. Source: [85].
I the Los Angeles region, the region l COG (Southern California Association of G vernme ts,
SCAG) organizes its 187 member cities into 15 spatial subunits that share geographic and transportation
concerns [86]. SCAG is the nation’s largest COG and oversees six counties with a population that
exceeds 18 million persons in an area that exceeds 38,000 square miles. Figure 1 illustrates the
Los Angeles region subset (n = 28), which includes the City of Los Angeles plus the 27 cities belonging
to the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments spatial subunit [87]. The San Gabriel Valley cities
were selected because they are spatially contiguous, near the central city, are urban, suburban, and rural
in character, and belong to a single COG subunit. On a monthly basis, this group of cities meets in
order discuss housing, planning, and transportation issues, as those issues pertain to each city and
the spatial group as influenced by SCAG or the state. In the Sacramento region, the regional COG
(Sacramento Area Council of Governments, SACOG) has 23 member cities; however, the cities of
Citrus Heights, Elk Grove, and Rancho Cordova were excluded due to their respective study period
incorporations (e.g., 1996, 2000, and 2003) and South Lake Tahoe due to its 100-mile distance from the
City of Sacramento [88]. Figure 2 illustrates the Sacramento region subset (n = 15), which includes the
City of Sacramento plus the 14 remaining member cities. The Sacramento region cities were selected
because they are spatially contiguous and dispersed, near and far from the central city, and suburban
and rural in character.
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As a non-random sample, the findings from this research will be limited to the sample; however,
the sample does exemplify other aspects of California’s Housing Element Law. First, the sample
observes regional governance in which CAHCD, the COGs, and the cities share responsibility for
low-income housing. In rural regions without a COG, CAHCD creates the housing allocation. Second,
the sample observes differences between central and suburban cities in urban regions. Suburbs in
urban regions may resist multifamily zoning in order to reduce the potential relocation of urban
low-income households [90].
Cities are the units of analysis and the cities’ housing plans (e.g., 1998–2005, 2006–2014) are
the units of observation. The 1998–2005 housing plans provide the content for the quality scores.
The 2006–2014 housing plans identify the low-income housing production data for 1998–2006 planning
period. No other data source links a city’s housing plan and the city’s low-income housing production.
To determine quality, scholars use a protocol to score a plan’s goals, facts, and policies. In this
phenomenon, goals were not suitable because they are broad and general in nature. In addition,
private consultants created many housing plans with similar goals and several housing plans contained
templated goals that did not change between the previous period (1991–1997) and the study period
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(1998–2005). Facts are important in describing housing demand (e.g., population, income levels,
poverty) but do not impart the discretionary housing and planning decisions made by a city’s elected
officials and planners. Policies may indicate a city’s commitment but do not detail specific actions.
In this study, each housing plan’s objectives were assessed because the objectives illuminate the city’s
commitment and action to accommodate low-income housing needs within a specific planning period.
A protocol should reflect the “normative criteria that is steeped in the purpose of the plan [and]
the specific planning domain” [2] (p. 434). This protocol reflects California’s law and contains 63 items
that were organized into four themes: audience (10 items), housing program (4 items), planning
tool (47 items), and evaluation (2 items). A city’s housing plan quality was determined by scoring
each objective found in the city’s 1998–2005 housing plan using the protocol items (0 = item not
present, 1 = present). Audience measures whether the objective identified one of the six special needs
households (SPN HH; i.e., the disabled, farm workers, female-headed households, the homeless,
large families, and seniors) as well as low-income households in contrast to first-time homebuyers,
infrastructure, or all households (e.g., none of the above, EE HH). The Housing Element Law neither
specifies first-time homebuyers as special needs households nor requires planning objectives for
their housing needs. Therefore, this audience type was included in EE HH. In addition, Shlay
argued that homeownership places low-income households into risk due to the household’s lack
of financial information and capital [91]. Housing program measures whether the objective advanced
a construction, rehabilitation, preservation, or tangential (e.g., supporting fair housing, engaging in
partnerships, lobbying congress) outcome. Planning tool measures whether the objective identified
any planning tool to facilitate low-income housing.
Evaluation measures whether the objective identified a measurable quantitative target. As per
the law, housing plans must implement actions during the planning period and may indicate “that
certain programs are ongoing” [40], § 65583 (c), italics added. The City of Lincoln, for example,
will assist 10 “elderly homeowners in rehabilitating their homes to address health and safety repairs,
accessibility needs, and energy efficiency” [92] (p. 18). In ongoing contrast, Lincoln will “continue to
require environmental reviews on residential development proposals to assess potential impacts as a
result of future development” [92] (p. 13). The Appendix A contains the protocol operations for the
above objectives.
The protocol was pretested on a sample of 1998–2005 housing plans. The pretest indicated
that a single objective might identify multiple audience, housing program, and planning tool
items. The non-mutually exclusive response issue was resolved by expanding the protocol, creating
proportional scoring, and devising nested quality measures that measured multiple interpretations
of the law (i.e., narrow, wide, and widest interpretations). As content analysis research, this study
employed a latent approach (qualitative) in order to determine whether the protocol’s criteria have
been satisfied and a manifest approach (quantitative) due to the scoring [93] (p. 17). To increase the
study’s reliability and validity, a trained graduate student coded roughly 40% (or 17/43) of the housing
plans using NVivo, a software program for analyzing qualitative data. This study’s coding agreement
is as follows: overall percentage agreement at 99.8%, Cohen’s Kappa at 89.8%, and Krippendorff’s
Alpha at 90.3%. These statistics can be interpreted as strong agreement [39,94–96]. Please note that the
NVivo program employs two methods for coding documents: by text and by image. By text means
that NVivo reads the document’s text. By image means that NVivo reads squares (or regions) drawn
on the document. In this study, the housing plans were created prior to the usage of Adobe Acrobat,
so NVivo treated the scanned documents as images. When calculating Cohen’s Kappa, NVivo treats
images differently than text. Therefore, some protocol items received Kappa statistics below 80%. I did
not discover this program anomaly until after completing coding the housing elements and speaking
with an NVivo consultant. In addition, scholars with extensive housing plan knowledge reviewed the
protocol and their feedback was incorporated into the protocol and proportional scoring. The protocol
lists each item, the item’s various coding agreements, and can be found as a supplemental file on this
publisher’s website.
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Due to the non-mutually exclusive responses, two mitigations were enacted: proportional scoring
and nested quality measures. Regarding the proportional scoring, in the City of Marysville, for example,
40.4% of the audience items identified a special needs household (SPN HH; 40.4% × 10 = 4.04).
Regarding the SPN HH housing program items, 27.3% were construction, 10.9% were rehabilitation,
5.4% were preservation, and 0% were tangential (43.6% × 10 = 4.36). Regarding the planning tools
items, 38.7% identified a SPN HH (38.7% × 10 = 3.87). Regarding the SPN HH evaluation items,
30.8% identified quantitative targets and 9.6% identified ongoing targets (40.4% × 10 = 4.04).
Table 1. Components of the Plan Quality Measures. Due to the non-mutually exclusive data, the theme
items were configured to test three interpretations of California’s Housing Element Law.
Theme Operation QNRW (Narrow) QWDE (Wide) QWDST (Widest)
Audience
Special Needs Households (SPN HH) X X X
First Time Homebuyers (FTHB) X
Housing Programs
Construction and SPN HH X X X
Rehabilitation and SPN HH X X X
Preservation and SPN HH X X X
Tangential and SPN HH X X
Tangential and FTHB X
Planning Tools Planning Tools and SPN HH X X X
Planning Tools and FTHB X X
Evaluation
Quantifiable and SPN HH X X X
Ongoing and SPN HH X X
Quantifiable and FTHB X
Ongoing and FTHB X
Note: QNRW is the narrow interpretation, focusing only on the special needs households. QWDE is the wide
interpretation, adding Tangential programs, First-Time Homebuyers, and some Ongoing values. QWDST is the
widest interpretation, adding all of the Special Needs Household and First-time Homebuyers values. Note. SPN
HH = Special Needs Households, FTHB = First-Time Homebuyers.
Regarding the nested quality measures, Table 1 describes how the protocol items fit into three
measures that test narrow, wide, and widest interpretations of the Housing Element Law. The variable
QNRW serves as the narrow interpretation and contains only the SPN HH identifications for audience,
housing programs, planning tools, and quantitative items. The variable QWDE serves as the wide
interpretation, employs QNRW as a base, adds the SPN HH tangential programming and ongoing
items, and adds the planning tools items for first-time homebuyers. The variable QWDST serves as the
widest interpretation, employs QWDE as a base, and adds the first-time homebuyers’ identifications for
audience, housing programs, and evaluation items. All quality measures had a maximum of 40 points.
Marysville’s respective narrow, wide, and widest quality scores were 15.4, 16.5, and 16.9 points. T-tests
indicated that the sample’s QNRW, QWDE, and QWDST means were unequal (p-value > 0.001 for
all tests).
The first research question (how do cities from the Los Angeles and Sacramento regions
accommodate low-income housing needs?) was answered using a descriptive analysis of the objectives.
The second research question (does the quality of a city’s housing plan influence the city’s low-income
housing production?) was answered using negative binomial regression. Negative binomial was
selected due to its ability to handle zeros, its goodness of fit measures (e.g., AIC, Log Likelihood),
its flexibility in testing variables with a large range of measures, and its usage in other planning
studies [97–100]. The response variable was each city’s low-income housing production for the years
of 1998–2005 (LIH), which reflects 8 years of city effort. The variable LIH was identified by obtaining a
city’s 2006–2014 housing plan and examining the plan’s evaluation of the 1998–2005 planning period.
California does not maintain any database of housing units associated with housing plans [101].
LIH is continuous data; however, the sample (n = 43) contains seven cities in which LIH is zero.
The experimental variables QNRW, QWDE, and QWDST are derived from the coding of the 1998–2005
housing plans.
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The control variables reflect the sample’s spatial, fiscal, regional, and population conditions
and came from the regional COGs (e.g., SACOG, SCAG), California state agencies (e.g., the State
Controller’s Office, CASCO; CAHCD), and federal agencies (e.g., the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
CENSUS; HUD). The variable Compliance measures whether a city’s housing plan annually complies
with the Housing Element Law as determined by CAHCD. The variable Consultant measures whether
a city’s 1998–2005 housing plan was created by private consultants as indicated by the plan (no = 0,
yes = 1). Due to the complexity of the Housing Element Law, many cities hire private consultants to
complete their housing plans. The variable Noncentral City measures whether a city is a central city in
order to observe the different levels of low-income housing production (no = 0, yes = 1). To account
for variation in income, the variable Household Income measures the city’s median household income,
as low-income households should expend no more than 30% of their income on housing (Year 2000;
CENSUS).
Because low-income housing is often associated with federal programs (e.g., Community
Development Block Grants, Emergency Shelter Funds, Housing for People with Aids, Housing Choice
Vouchers), the variable HUD Entitlement City measures whether a city is directly eligible for HUD
funds (Year 2000 population greater than 50,000 persons: no = 0, yes = 0; CENSUS). The variable
Region measures each city’s location (LAX = 0, SAC = 1). Lastly, the variable Sales Tax measures the
city’s annual sales tax revenue as a proportion of total annual revenue (CASCO). Under California’s
Bradley-Burns Act, the state returns a percentage of sales tax revenue to cities and counties for
discretionary spending [102]. What is important about Sales Tax is that (a) its creation is influenced by
municipal land-use policy to zone land for commercial uses; (b) the annual proportion of the returned
tax to total municipal revenue may be as low as 5% or as high as 60%; and (c) the amount returned to
municipalities may fluctuate from year to year. Table 2 summarizes the data and the Appendix A lists
the sample cities and their quality measures as well as data references.
Table 2. Summary statistics of the regression variables, n = 43.
Variable Min Max Mean SD
Compliance 0 1 0.657 0.269
Consultant 0 1 0.70 0.465
Noncentral City 0 1 0.95 0.213
Low-income Housing Production 0 11,674 736.50 2118.53
Household Income 25,750 117,300 49,600 17,886.93
HUD Entitlement City 0 1 0.33 0.474
QNRW 6.25 31.76 20.84 5.123
QWDE 10 36.07 24.85 5.695
QWDST 10 37.97 26.11 6.324
Region 0 1 0.35 0.482
Sales Taxes 0.01 0.66 0.33 0.154
Note: SD = Standard Deviation.
To determine the best model, various models were tested with LIH (e.g., logged, not logged, as a
share of allocated low-income housing needs, as a share of total residential permits). LIH (not logged)
was selected because either the models did not statistically converge or no predicting variable was
statistically significant. The variable Household Income was transformed by dividing each value by
1000 to ease interpretation and the Compliance and Sales Tax measures were averaged from 1998–2005.
The results section includes the expected counts of selected variables. The expected counts were
calculated by using the subject variable’s values (e.g., if dichotomous, then 0 or 1; if continuous, then
min, max, and mean) and the means of the other predicting variables multiplied by the model’s
coefficients. Due to a lack of significance, the following variables were excluded: Adjacent Cities
(quantity of cities spatially contiguous to the examined city; SACOG/SCAG), City Revenue (annual
revenues; CASCO), Distance (distance between the central and noncentral city halls; SACOG/SCAG),
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Population (Year 2000 population; CENSUS), and Subsidy (has a redevelopment agency; CASCO). For all
regression tests, multicollinearity was not detected (e.g., Variance-Inflation statistics < 2) [103].
5. Results
5.1. How Did Cities from the Los Angeles and Sacramento Regions Accommodate Low-Income Housing Needs?
The analysis of 43 housing plans indicates that overall, the plans averaged 31.8 objectives per
document (Min: 7, SD: 23.23), with Sacramento, Davis, and Los Angeles, respectively, containing the
most objectives at 92, 109, and 114. While scholars and planners might expect many objectives from
the large urban central cities, Davis is notable due to its growth boundary, residential permit quotas,
and inclusionary zoning [104]. The subsequent analysis of each protocol theme will reference the
special needs households (SPN HH) in relationship to everyone else (EE HH: all households, first-time
homebuyers, infrastructure) and, when warranted, the individual audience types.
5.1.1. Audience
The audience analysis in Table 3 indicates that overall, the planners attended to low-income
housing needs, as 59% (or 910/1533) of the objectives identified the SPN HHs versus 41% (or 643/1553)
for the EE HHs. The dominance of the SPN HHs also suggests that the planners adhered to fair-share
proportions because the sample’s overall audience proportions synchronized with the sample’s overall
housing allocation (roughly SPN HHs at 60%, EE HHs at 40%). Disaggregating the identification of
the SPN HH items indicates that the low-income households led at 38.1%, then the homeless at 7%,
seniors at 6%, the disabled at 5%, and closing with large-families, farmworkers, and female-headed
households at 1% or less.
Table 3. Audience types by overall identifications.
Audience Group Total Identifications Percentage
Low-income Households SPN HH 588 37.9%
Homeless SPN HH 102 6.6%
Seniors SPN HH 100 6.4%
Disabled SPN HH 83 5.3%
Large Families SPN HH 18 1.2%
Farm Workers SPN HH 12 0.8%
Female-headed Households SPN HH 7 0.5%
Subtotal 910 58.60%
All Households EE-HH 543 35.0%
First-time Homebuyers EE-HH 80 5.2%
Infrastructure EE-HH 20 1.3%
Subtotal 643 41%
Grand Total 1553 100.0%
Note: SPN HH = Special Needs Households, EE HH = Everyone Else Households.
5.1.2. Programs
The housing program analysis in Table 4 indicates that, overall, planners continued their
emphasis on low-income housing, as the SPN HHs led in construction, rehabilitation, and preservation
programming (ranging from 59% to 82% of items per program), whereas the EE HHs led in tangential
programming (roughly 76%). The categories of preservation and tangential maintained the largest
disparity between the SPN HHs and EE HHs (respective differences of 63% and 53%). Regarding
preservation programs, the objectives identifying the SPN HHs consistently specified maintaining each
city’s supply of housing vouchers and/or monitoring private low-income housing contracts, whereas
the preservation objectives that identified EE HHs specified implementing code enforcement, historic
preservation, and/or adaptive reuse and may actually increase home values, for example. The dual
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interpretations of preservation stems from the dual definitions of preservation in California’s law.
For many cities, section 65,583 of the law provides a wide interpretation of preservation, as noted below:
“The housing element shall consist of an identification and analysis of existing and projected housing
needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified objectives, financial resources, and scheduled
programs for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing.”
A key point of the above passage is that a household’s income is not tied to preservation.
Therefore, the creation of a historic district, the issuing of CDBG funds for preserving historic homes,
or the promotion of California’s Mills Act (tax reductions for owners of historic properties) suffices
as preservation. Alternatively, California’s Housing Element Law specifically ties preservation to
low-income households. For example, § 65583 (c) (6) of the law requires that the housing plan identify
objectives that will:
“preserve for lower income households the assisted housing developments [that are may change
from low-income housing uses during the next 10 years due to termination of subsidy contracts,
mortgage prepayment, or expiration of restrictions on use. The program for preservation of the
assisted housing developments shall utilize, to the extent necessary, all available federal, state,
and local financing and subsidy programs . . . ”
Quite simply, the law allows a city to implement non-overlapping definitions of preservation.
Regarding tangential programs, the objectives identifying the EE HHs consistently specified second
mortgages (for first-time homebuyers) and capital improvements, whereas the tangential objectives
identifying the SPN HHs specified the planning process, including conducting a study on seniors,
lobbying funding agencies, and expending redevelopment funds. Table A2 quantitatively lists the
audience types by housing program.
Table 4. Housing programs by identifications. The appendix lists the individual audience type by
housing program.
Programs SPN HH EE HH Total
Construction 510 328 838
Rehabilitation 214 149 363
Preservation 247 56 303
Tangential 52 168 220
Grand Total 1023 701 1724
Note. SPN HH = Special Needs Households, EE HH = Everyone Else Households.
5.1.3. Planning Tools
The planning tool analysis in Table 5 indicates that, overall, the planners applied 47 planning tools
to facilitate housing production, reflecting not only each city’s conditions (urban, suburban, rural) but
also variation in overall housing needs. The tools ranged from land-use (zoning, design review, historic
preservation, TOD), to entitlements (permit streamlining, development standards, nonconforming
development), to policy consideration (inclusionary housing, workforce housing, impact fees, rent
control). Table 5 indicates that zoning was the most frequently identified tool at 15% (or 299/1978).
Regarding low-income housing needs, more tools addressed the SPN HHs (n = 1133) than the
EE HHs (n = 845). On average, the housing plans applied roughly 11 planning tools to facilitate
low-income housing (min: 2, max: 23, SD: 4.25). Table 6 ranks the top 20 low-income housing tools,
with residential rehabilitation leading at roughly 16%, then zoning at 15%, transitional housing at
10%, sites/density at 7%, and density bonus and development standards at 6% each. The top 20 list
also contains six planning tools identified by Aurand [67]. Patterns emerged between certain tools
and the SPN HHs. The application of transitional housing (n = 115) primarily benefited the homeless
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(73% or 84%) and the disabled (15% or 17%). To accommodate senior housing needs (n = 128), the
municipalities applied residential rehabilitation to facilitate aging in place (15% or 19%), zoning
overlays (13% or 16%), and density bonuses (12% or 15%).
Table 5. The top fifteen planning tools ranked by total identifications. See the appendix for the complete
list of 47 planning tools.
Rank Planning Tool Total Identifications Percentage
1 Zoning 299 15.12%
2 Residential Rehabilitation 234 11.83%
3 Sites, Density 144 7.28%
4 Transitional Housing 115 5.81%
5 Development Standards 98 4.95%
6 Density Bonus 77 3.89%
7 Permit Streamlining 69 3.49%
8 Code Enforcement 62 3.13%
9 Infill or Vacant Land 61 3.08%
10 Fair Housing 57 2.88%
11 Universal Building Code, Energy Standards, Title 24 Building Code 56 2.83%
12 Municipal Purchase or Write Down 55 2.78%
13 Waived Fees 52 2.63%
14 Subsidy 46 2.33%
15 Mobile or Manufactured Homes 45 2.28%
Table 6. The top twenty planning tools that accommodate low-income housing needs ranked by total
SPN HH identifications.
Rank Planning Tool Total SPN HH Identifications Percentage
1 Residential Rehabilitation 178 15.71%
2 Zoning 167 14.74%
3 Transitional Housing 115 10.15%
4 Sites, Density 75 6.62%
5 Density Bonus 72 6.35%
6 Development Standards 69 6.09%
7 Municipal Purchase or Write Down 51 4.50%
8 Waived Fees * 42 3.71%
9 Subsidy 41 3.62%
10 Inclusionary Housing * 34 3.00%
11 Self-Sufficiency 33 2.91%
12 Permit Streamlining * 27 2.38%
13 Mobile or Manufactured Homes * 24 2.12%
14 Infill or Vacant Land 21 1.85%
15 Accessory Dwellings * 20 1.77%
16 Relocation or Displacement Policies 18 1.59%
17 Mixed-Use 16 1.41%
18 Co-Housing or Limited Equity Owners 14 1.24%
19 Covenants 11 0.97%
20 Housing Element Monitoring * 9 0.79%
Note. * = Planning Tool identified by Aurand for facilitating low-income housing [67]. SPN HH = Special Needs
Households. See the Appendix A for the full list.
5.1.4. Evaluation
The evaluation analysis in Table 7 indicates that, overall, the planners specified a balance of
quantitative and ongoing objectives to facilitate overall housing production (respectively 49% and 51%)
and low-income housing (respectively 52% and 48%). Of the total quantitative objectives (n = 767),
nearly 63% (or 482) identified a SPN HH and specified measureable actions such as zone changes
for increased density; ordinance adoptions to facilitate accessory dwellings; feasibility studies on
inclusionary housing, impact fees, or rent control; and/or targets for rehabilitated homes. Of the total
ongoing objectives (n = 805), nearly 55% (or 444) identified the SPN HHs and pledged to continue to
offer density bonuses, waived fees, and/or modified development standards. Of the ten audience
categories, the disabled objectives were remarkably unbalanced with roughly 69% as quantitatively
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measurable and 31% as ongoing. This imbalance reflected planners responding to the passage of SB 520,
which required the immediate modification of residential development standards in order to provide
reasonable accommodation as well as completing zone changes to permit group homes [105]. Lastly,
balance is good, but in this phenomena balance in evaluation means that roughly 51% (or 805/1572) of
housing plan implementation cannot support a critical evaluation.
Table 7. Audience Types by Evaluation Identifications. In general, the audience types maintained a
balance of quantitative and ongoing objectives, except for the Disabled, which skewed quantitative.
Audience Group Quantitative Ongoing Total
Low-income Households SPN HH 305 295 600
Homeless SPN HH 52 50 102
Seniors SPN HH 50 52 102
Disabled SPN HH 57 26 83
Large Families SPN HH 9 11 20
Farm Workers SPN HH 6 6 12
Female-headed Households SPN HH 3 4 7
Subtotal 482 444 926
All Households EE-HH 231 315 546
First-time Homebuyers EE-HH 45 35 80
Infrastructure EE-HH 9 11 20
Subtotal 305 361 643
Grand Total 767 805 1572
In summary, the planners heeded California’s fair-share goals by committing extensive planning
on behalf of low-income households. Table 8 indicates that roughly 60% of allocated housing needs
should accommodate low-income households. The quality measures listed in Table 2 indicates that on
average, the three quality measures ranged from roughly 21 to 26 points. Since the maximum quality
score is 40 points, these rough averages indicate that between 53% to 65% of planning implementation
addressed low-income housing needs, which closely syncs with the overall housing allocation that
roughly specifies 60% low-income housing needs and 40% market rate housing needs. Second,
the planners designated construction as the primary program for accommodating low-income housing
needs, combating NIMBYism. Third, the planners applied a variety of planning tools to facilitate
low-income housing. Finally, the planners identified specific tasks for facilitating low-income housing.
While these points are quite positive, some issues linger.
Table 8. Housing Allocation by Units Constructed (n = 43, 1998–2005). Regarding housing production,
the sample produced roughly 40% of its low-income allocation, in contrast to roughly 163% of its
market-rate allocation.
Income Category Units Allocated % Allocated Units Constructed % Constructed
Low-income Housing 77,613 59.97% 31,168 40.16%
Market-rate Housing 51,791 40.03% 83,984 162.16%
Grand Total 129,404 100.00% 115,152 88.99%
Sources: Allocation [106,107]. Low-income Housing = the 2006–2014 housing plans.
With the multiplicity of housing programs, planning tools, and ongoing objectives, one could
argue that multiplicity provides planners with a wide berth for satisfying low-income housing needs.
California allows small cities (e.g., Bradbury, Colfax, Irwindale, or South Pasadena) to accommodate
housing needs in a manner that reflects their size, spatial location, housing market conditions,
and/or planning capacity. The housing programs from small cities might be similar to those from
medium-sized cities (e.g., Davis, Duarte, La Puente, Rocklin, or Roseville) and significantly different
Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 1 20 of 32
from the housing programs from the cities of Los Angeles and Sacramento. This is the strength of
California’s Housing Element Law; the law does not impose a one-size-fits-all prescription.
Alternatively, one could argue that the multiplicity of housing programs, planning tools,
and objectives represents a scattershot approach to planning. These housing plans might symbolize
empty promises in order to achieve compliance because California does not impose a penalty, require
implementation of the construction, rehabilitation, and preservation objectives, or evaluates housing
production. Furthermore, this culpability extends to private consultants, who created roughly 70%
(or 30/43) of the plans. As noted by one planner when interviewed by Goetz et al. “I couldn’t have
told you that was in the plan. Sounds like one of those great consultant ideas” [77] (p. 220). In closing,
the planners from these Los Angeles and California region cities facilitated low-income housing using
a very wide interpretation of California’s Housing Element Law; however, would a focused approach
have been more successful? Table 8 also indicates that the sample constructed roughly 40% of its overall
low-income housing needs in contrast to constructing 162% of its overall market-rate housing needs.
5.2. Did Quality Influence Low-Income Housing Production?
As a solitary predictor, the negative binomial regression analysis (see the Appendix A) indicates
that the quality measures (i.e., QNRW, QWDE, or QWDST) maintained no statistical relationship with
low-income housing production. Quality’s solitary failure was not surprising given a preliminary
correlation analysis (see the Appendix A). However, the negative binomial regression analysis in
Table 9 indicates that the quality measures maintained a statistical relationship with low-income
housing when a city’s other conditions are taken into consideration. Quite simply, the quality of the
housing plan is not enough to create low-income housing, but in this sample, the city’s planning
(Compliance), location (Noncentral City, Region), land-use (Sales Tax), and population (HUD Entitlement
City) play important contributing roles. Because the sample contains the cities of Los Angeles and
Sacramento, models were run without these cities and all variables remained statistically significant
(excepting Noncentral City, which was eliminated). In addition, the ranges of the expected counts did
not significantly decrease with the exclusion of the central cities. Models 1–3 test three interpretations
of California’s law. However, model 3 (i.e., widest interpretation) is closest to how the cities create
their housing plans. Therefore, the following discussion reflects the estimates and expected counts of
model 3.
Regarding the quality measures, the model 3 estimates indicate that the widest interpretation
of California’s Housing Element Law maintains the strongest relationship between quality measures
and low-income housing production. For the variable QWDST, and when all variables are held
constant, a city’s expected low-income housing production should be at least 429 units if that city has a
QWDST score near 26.11 points. In this sample, 29 cities maintained QWDST scores that were within
one standard deviation of the mean; however, only 10 cities produced low-income unit in excess of
429 units. The average QWDST scores of those 10 cities was roughly 25.78 points (in keeping with
the mean), but two cities stood out. The city of Sacramento produced 7358 low-income units but
maintained a low QWDST score of 14.13 points. In contrast, the city of El Monte maintained a high
QWDST score of 34.83 points and only produced 495 low-income units. These examples illustrate the
variation in housing plan quality and low-income housing production. Quality may contribute to
low-income housing, but it may not be the most influential factor.
For the variable Compliance, and when all other variables are held constant, a city’s expected
low-income housing production should be at least 429 units if that city’s housing plan was for 70%
(or 5.6 of 8 years) of the planning period. While this study did not observe the adoption year of each
housing plan, it is not uncommon for a city to obtain compliance during the last year of its planning
period {108]. Thus, the longer the plan is in compliance, the more likely that the plan may be positively
associated with increases in low-income housing. Regarding Noncentral City, and when all other
variables are held constant at their means, the sample’s suburban and rural cities will have significantly
lower low-income housing production (358 units) than the central cities (4915 units).
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Regarding HUD Entitlement City, and when all other variables are held constant, when a city’s year
2000 population was over 50,000 persons, then that city should expect a low-income housing production
of at least 3301 units. Noting that the cities of Los Angeles and Sacramento have significantly higher
production (i.e., 11,674 and 7358, respectively), a model excluding those large cities indicates that a
HUD Entitlement City should expect roughly 3046 low-income units. In essence, entitlement status may
not only signal population but also greater access to federal programs that increase low-income housing.
In their reporting of low-income units (and California’s acceptance of the housing plan), the cities do
not quibble about whether HUD programs, federal and state tax credits, local redevelopment funds,
or private organizations such a Habitat for Humanity facilitated the low-income units. Quite simply,
a low-income unit was constructed within the city.
Table 9. The Negative Binomial Tests. In Models 1–3, the quality measures (QNRW, QWDE,
and QWDST) maintained statistically significant relationships with Low-income Housing Production.
In addition, the control variables of Compliance, Noncentral City, HUD Entitlement City, Sales Tax,
and Region also maintained consistent statistically significant relationships.
Variable






Estimate Var. = 0 Var. = 1 Min Max Mean
(Intercept) 0.203 0.59 0.276
(2.364) (2.322) (2.294)










HUD Entitlement City 3.024 *** 2.666 *** 2.527 *** 160 3301
(0.568) (0.575) (0.57)
Sales Tax
−4.560 * −5.093 ** −5.172 ** 1581 81 437
(1.795) (1.76) (1.748)









0.205 *** 19.35 4203.01 429.21
(0.047)
Observations 43 43 43
Log Likelihood −496.234 −494.378 −493.300
AIC 516.23 514.38 513.30
Response Variable LIH LIH LIH
Notes. LIH = Low-Income Housing Production. SE = Standard Error. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
VAR = Variable.
Regarding Sales Tax, cities not relying on this revenue (e.g., minimum at 1%) will have higher
low-income production (e.g., 1581 units) than cities relying on this revenue (e.g., maximum at
66%, 81 low-income units) because sales tax requires commercial land-use, not residential land-use.
The sample’s cities with Sales Tax proportions of 50% and higher include Colfax, Duarte, Industry,
Marysville, South El Monte, and Yuba City. This six-city subgroup maintained low populations
(subgroup average of roughly 15,600 persons) and a lower than average QWDST scores (roughly
20 points). Furthermore, four of these cities produced zero low-income units. As noted by Steinacker,
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a city’s pursuit of economic development and low-income housing may conflict with cities preference
for increased revenues over increased service needs [108].
Regarding Region, the Sacramento region cities’ low-income housing production should be
1247 low-income units higher than that of the Los Angeles region cities. Three factors contributed to this
location increase. First, the cities of Lincoln, Rocklin, and Roseville increased their regulatory footprints
by annexing sphere of influence farmland into subdivisions and by requiring that those areas set aside
low-income housing. Second, the City of Davis annually restricts market-rate housing production with
quotas but exempts low-income housing production. Consequently, Davis produced 1309 low-income
housing units in the study period, which was roughly 5.5% of its year 2000 housing inventory of
23,611 units. The same respective proportions for the city of Sacramento was 4.5% (or 7538/163,914)
in contrast to 0.8% (or 11,674/1,335,668) for the city of Los Angeles. Third, SACOG proposed state
legislation in 2003 to create a voluntary regional inclusionary housing program. The Regional Compact
for Production of Affordable Housing (Assembly Bill AB 1426, session 2003–2004 [109]) would have
required that 10% of new housing units to be set aside as low-income housing units (i.e., construction
or rehabilitation) and provided up to 13 million dollars in subsidies. By September 2004, 17 cities had
joined this proposed program before the legislation received the governor’s veto [110].
In summary, the inferential analysis has significant findings, but they are limited to the sample.
First, and when independent, quality has no association with low-income housing production,
but when quality is combined other city conditions, it maintains a positive association with low-income
housing. Second, there were regional differences in low-income housing production, as the Sacramento
region cities had higher production than the Los Angeles region cities. A key factor was that Sacramento
region cities had access to vacant land for expansion, whereas the Los Angeles region cites are confined.
Third, the suburban and rural cities had a lower production of low-income units than the central
cities. This difference could be expected given the central cities’ population and planning capacity
(e.g., number objectives in their plans, including the efforts of other agencies). Fourth, a city’s pursuit
of increased sale tax revenue may decrease the viability of low-income housing production. Lastly,
the central cities may have influenced the inferential analysis; however, the removal of the central
cities indicated that there was no major change in either a variable’s significance or the quantities in
the expected counts.
6. Discussion
The Impact and Meaning of Quality
The purpose of this study was to explore whether the quality of a plan influences the plan’s
intended outcome and whether a plan’s quality advances equity. In this examination of California’s
Housing Element Law, there are two research questions. First, how do cities from the Los Angeles
and Sacramento regions accommodate low-income housing needs? The analysis of housing plans
from a nonrandom sample of cities indicates that the plans’ content synchronized with the sample’s
fair-share housing allocation, with roughly 60% of content addressing low-income housing needs.
Regarding housing programs (e.g., construction, rehabilitation, and preservation), these cities placed
low-income households at the forefront, with the construction of new low-income units taking
the lead. The construction preference indicates that these cities heeded California’s mandate to
increase the housing options for low-income households. The construction preference is also notable,
as planning literature is redolent with communities opposing any increase in low-income housing [111].
The planning tool data indicates that these cities preferred to facilitate low-income residential
rehabilitation. One caution is that rehabilitation may trigger a tax reassessment unless a homeowner
is certified as disabled [112]. The planning tool data also indicates that planners deliberated about
selecting the appropriate tool for their community’s unique context. Alternatively, the multiple
planning tools also signal that there was no silver bullet for facilitating low-income housing. Lastly,
the balanced proportion of quantitative and ongoing objectives meant that nearly 50% of the sample’s
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implementation could not support critical evaluation. This omission short-circuits feedback necessary
for local and state housing policy reform.
The second research question was does the quality of a city’s housing plan influence the city’s
low-income housing production? The analysis indicates that, independently, a housing plan’s quality
maintains no association with low-income housing production for these cities. However, when quality
is coupled with other city conditions, such as the plan’s compliance with California’s housing laws,
the city’s HUD status, or location (e.g., region or suburban/rural), these conditions are associated
with increases in low-income housing. By contrast, a city’s economic decision to rely on sales tax
revenue is associated with reduced low-income housing production. Collectively, these associations
indicate that a housing plan’s quality is one of many conditions that might influence a city’s inventory
of low-income housing.
While this study is one of only a few studies that establishes a statistical association between
quality and planning outcomes, there are two issues that should be addressed: the sample and the
statistical test. Regarding the non-random sample, this study assessed housing plans from 43 cities
in California’s Los Angeles and Sacramento regions. Because of the study’s intention to observe any
differences in low-income housing production between dominant central cities and their suburbs,
the sample included not only the state’s largest cities, Los Angeles and Sacramento, but also small cities
such as Bradbury, Colfax, Wheatland, and San Marino. It was noted that the central cities of Los Angeles
and Sacramento were outliers not only in housing objectives but also in low-income housing production
in comparison to the other sample cities. For example, the city of Los Angeles produced nearly as
many low-income units as all the suburbs combined (e.g., 11,674 units vs. 12,637 units, respectively).
In the other quality housing studies discussed in the literature review, the scholars paid very little
attention to the size of cities. For example, the sample and population sizes in Jun’s assessment of plans
from 58 cities in the Atlanta and Detroit regions and Brody’s assessment of plans from 60 cities in the
states of Florida and Washington are unknown [3,16]. By contrast, Connerly and Mueller intentionally
analyzed housing plans from large and small Florida cities and counties [65]. Had any of those studies
conducted inferential tests with housing production data, would the authors have included the large
central cities? Would the authors have pursued a random sample, a stratified random sample, or a
non-random sample? Each of those decisions would yield results, but they would require measures of
caution in the interpretation of the analysis.
Regarding the statistical test, a few issues should be noted. First, the inclusion of the central cities
had the potential to skew the inferential analysis; however, models examined without the central cities
indicated that the estimates did not dramatically change. Second, a more robust inferential analysis
would have had a larger sample size. While the quality method is easy to understand and implement,
quality studies seem to rest at sample sizes of 60 or 30 plans, or even smaller. These small sizes may
limit the application of more sensitive statistical tests. Therefore, does a descriptive analysis of a plan’s
content suffice as noteworthy scholarship? Without linking the plan’s aims to the plan’s outcomes,
the study may contribute to scholarship and hinder the planner’s ability to reform policy.
Regarding the purpose and the aims of this study, quality was found to influence planning
outcomes and advance equity. This study found that planners attempted to achieve California’s
vision for housing equity, as 60% of housing plan content addressed low-income housing needs.
This simple statistic demonstrates that fair-share planning principles can drive planning equity and
direction. Therefore, what should quality mean to planners? Before we sound the trumpets, this
study, like the other quality scholarship, assessed the plans post adoption and therefore missed an
opportunity to revise local housing policy. Second, this is only one study that links planning aims
and planning outcomes. While this study succeeded in detecting associations, the success rests on
a non-random sample. More studies are needed to confirm the influence of quality. A statistical
relationship between plan content and low-income housing was detected in this sample, but what
about the quality discourse’s other focus areas, such as disaster planning, environmental mediation,
transportation, climate change, and/or sustainability? While quality has illuminated plan content
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in these other areas, can any of that plan content systematically influence the planning outcomes?
Scholars should raise the bar and investigate.
As scholars, our purpose is to describe, investigate, and test phenomena to increase our collective
knowledge as well as improve planning implementation and education. In this study, quality
illuminated plan content and aided in the explanation of low-income housing production. However,
in quality’s current iteration (i.e., post hoc assessments), the method is too removed from actual
implementation. Too many quality scholars do not evaluate outcomes. In its initial years, quality
provided valuable insights on plan content and, by extension, planning behavior. Twenty years later,
quality scholars must deepen quality’s epistemology.
How should scholars and planners view quality? While popular, quality is neither theory nor
meta-theory. Meta-theory is “the philosophy behind the theory, the fundamental set of ideas about
how phenomena of interest in a particular field should be thought about and researched” [113] (p. 2).
Bates positioned meta-theory as a connective tissue that links models to theory, with meta-theory as
less robust than Kuhn’s paradigms [114] (p. 64). At present, quality is an uncultivated model that only
describes planning outputs, the plans. To deepen quality, scholars must not only descriptively assess
plans but also test the influence of quality on planning outcomes. It is safe to say that quality is not
embedded in planning practice. Planners may aspire to create plans that satisfy the requirements of
local codes and state mandates, but none of the reviewed research indicates that planners strive for
quality plans using the scholar definition of quality. If scholars want quality to matter to planners,
then scholars must demonstrate that quality has influence. Given the recent storms in Florida, Texas,
and Puerto Rico, it behooves scholars to link quality, a plan’s performance, and a locale’s outcomes.
In a symposium, Dyckman argued that the principal use of theory is to explain or justify
institutionalized planning and thus exhorted, “the planner must have a theory of action and decision
that [she] can use to defend [the] intervention” [115] (p. 229). This quality study established a
connection between planning processes and planning outcomes and found other conditions that were
as influential. This paper calls for more empirical quality studies. Scholars considering a quality study
should test quality against an outcome related to a plan. Scholars who have completed a quality study
can and should retrospectively test quality against an outcome related to the plan’s intended aims.
If future research can determine that quality does influence outcomes, then quality should be
included in planning education and serve as a method for assessing draft plans to engage both
planners and decision makers [6]. Under this new paradigm, when a planner creates a comprehensive,
affordable housing, climate action, or transportation plan, the planner should be able to (a) assess a
plan’s goals, facts, and implementation policies and then (b) determine how well that content addresses
the plan’s intended outcome. If there is low quality, then the planner should revise the plan before
the plan’s adoption and subsequent implementation. Assessing draft plans may improve outcome
delivery and provide a stronger link between planning scholarship and practice. By shifting quality to
empiricism, scholars include planners by acknowledging that planners, plans, and outcomes inspire
our scholarship [116] (pp. 246–247).
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umass.edu/data/4/.
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Appendix
Table A1. Components of the plan quality measures. This table demonstrates how two objectives were
assessed by the items in the protocol.
Objective Audience Program Planning Tool Evaluation
Assist [10] elderly homeowners
in rehabilitating their homes to
address health and safety repairs,











proposals to assess potential
impacts as a result of future
development.
All Households Construction California EnvironmentalQuality Act; Zoning Ongoing
Table A2. Audience types by housing programs. Excepting first-time homebuyers, construction was
the most identified housing program for the audience types.
Rank Audience Construction Rehabilitation Preservation Tangential Total
1 Low-incomeHouseholds 311 158 173 20 662
2 All Households 307 135 53 90 585
3 Homeless 49 6 43 19 117
4 Seniors 62 21 17 6 106
5 The Disabled 56 21 12 7 96
6 First-time HomeBuyer 9 8 3 73 93
7 Infrastructure 12 6 0 5 23
8 Large Families 16 3 1 0 20
9 Farm Workers 12 1 0 0 13
10 Female-headedHouseholds 4 4 1 0 9
Grand Total 838 363 303 220 1724
Table A3. Planning tools ranked by total identifications.
Rank Planning Tool TotalIdentifications Percentage SPN HH EE HH
1 Zoning 299 15.1% 167 132
2 Residential Rehabilitation 234 11.8% 178 56
3 Sites, Density * 144 7.3% 75 69
4 Transitional Housing 115 5.8% 115 0
5 Development Standards 98 5.0% 69 29
6 Density Bonus 77 3.9% 72 5
7 Permit Streamlining * 69 3.5% 27 42
8 Code Enforcement 62 3.1% 2 60
9 Infill or Vacant Land 61 3.1% 21 40
10 Fair Housing 57 2.9% 2 55
11 Universal Building Code, Energy Standards, Title 24 Building Code 56 2.8% 7 49
12 Municipal Purchase or Write Down 55 2.8% 51 4
13 Waived Fees * 52 2.6% 42 10
14 Subsidy 46 2.3% 41 5
15 Mobile or Manufactured Homes * 45 2.3% 24 21
16 Mixed-use 45 2.3% 16 29
17 Accessory Dwellings * 41 2.1% 20 21
18 Inclusionary Housing * 39 2.0% 34 5
19 Neighborhood Rehabilitation 39 2.0% 8 31
20 Housing Element Monitoring * 34 1.7% 9 25
21 Self-sufficiency 33 1.7% 33 0
22 Relocation or Displacement Policies 30 1.5% 18 12
23 Historic Preservation 25 1.3% 5 20
24 Design Review 24 1.2% 8 16
25 Capital Project 23 1.2% 3 20
26 Specific Plan 22 1.1% 9 13
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Table A3. Cont.
Rank Planning Tool TotalIdentifications Percentage SPN HH EE HH
27 Co-housing or Limited Equity Owners 18 0.9% 14 4
28 Annexation, Tentative Map 16 0.8% 5 11
29 Planned Unit Development 13 0.7% 7 6
30 Fees 13 0.7% 5 8
31 Condo Conversion * 12 0.6% 9 3
32 Covenants 11 0.6% 11 0
33 Citizen Participation 11 0.6% 2 9
34 Transit-oriented Development 10 0.5% 1 9
35 American Disabilities Act 9 0.5% 7 2
36 Memorandum of Understanding, Housing Agreements 7 0.4% 3 4
37 Nonconforming 7 0.4% 1 6
38 Student Housing 5 0.3% 0 5
39 Household Subsidy 4 0.2% 4 0
40 Rent Control 4 0.2% 3 1
41 Workforce Housing 4 0.2% 0 4
42 Childcare Facilities 2 0.1% 2 0
43 Reverse Mortgage 2 0.1% 2 0
44 California Environmental Qualities Act 2 0.1% 0 2
45 Single-room Occupancy 1 0.1% 1 0
46 Growth Management 1 0.1% 0 1
47 Tax Fines 1 0.1% 0 1
1978 100.0% 1133 845
Note. * = Planning Tool identified by Aurand for facilitating low-income housing [67]. SPN HH = Special Needs
Households, EE HH = Everyone Else Households.
Table A4. Sample (Alphabetized). This table identifies the three quality scores and low-income housing
production for each city.
Row City Name QNRW QWDE QWDST LIH
1 Alhambra 23.508 27.702 30.371 239
2 Arcadia 23.608 29.148 31.690 6
3 Auburn 21.405 23.905 23.905 94
4 Azusa 21.511 26.174 30.206 119
5 Baldwin Park 24.189 26.258 28.308 202
6 Bradbury 6.250 10.000 10.000 9
7 Claremont 18.410 22.076 22.713 49
8 Colfax 18.601 20.964 21.712 7
9 Davis 21.388 24.203 24.459 1309
10 Diamond Bar 24.440 28.249 29.440 3
11 Duarte 31.761 33.428 33.428 97
12 El Monte 28.484 33.187 34.832 495
13 Galt 18.961 22.972 22.972 77
14 Glendora 18.975 21.702 24.370 0
15 Industry 14.603 19.048 19.048 0
16 Irwindale 24.482 24.482 24.482 20
17 La Puente 17.954 22.843 22.843 2
18 La Verne 26.765 33.430 35.033 110
19 Lincoln 19.663 21.249 21.798 2712
20 Live Oak 14.247 17.073 17.561 0
21 Loomis 18.506 21.172 21.172 13
22 Los Angeles 22.502 25.471 26.594 11,674
23 Marysville 15.357 16.510 16.885 0
24 Monrovia 18.441 21.738 25.107 69
25 Monterey Park 18.592 22.723 23.791 118
26 Pasadena 19.643 24.378 26.873 1119
27 Pomona 16.347 22.535 23.880 575
28 Rocklin 24.873 30.473 31.273 2961
29 Rosemead 27.726 32.395 35.173 72
30 Roseville 18.946 22.400 23.804 1101
31 Sacramento 11.313 13.933 14.132 7358
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Table A4. Cont.
Row City Name QNRW QWDE QWDST LIH
32 San Dimas 26.293 29.370 30.077 15
33 San Gabriel 22.804 28.476 30.254 64
34 San Marino 11.111 14.444 14.444 10
35 South El Monte 22.292 28.125 33.125 0
36 South Pasadena 29.505 34.721 37.968 3
37 Temple City 27.889 36.071 36.071 12
38 Walnut 21.957 29.155 33.338 116
39 West Covina 19.482 27.846 30.131 506
40 West Sacramento 19.487 24.636 25.163 275
41 Wheatland 25.245 27.073 27.073 0
42 Winters 19.986 25.017 25.017 58
43 Yuba City 18.718 21.909 22.339 0
Minimum 6.25 10.00 10.00 0
Maximum 31.76 36.07 37.97 11,760
Mean 20.84 24.85 26.11 736.50
Note. LIH = Low Income Housing Production from 1998–2005, QNRW = Narrow Interpretation of the Housing
Element Law, QWDE = Wide Interpretation, QWDST = Widest Interpretation. Source: American Factfinder.
Table A5. The negative binomial tests.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B (SE) Estimate B (SE) Estimate B (SE) Estimate











Observations 43 43 43
Log Likelihood −532.692 −532.127 −531.861
AIC 538.69 538.13 537.86
Response Variable LIH LIH LIH
Note. LIH = Low-Income Housing Production, SE = Standard Error, QNRW = Narrow Interpretation of the Housing
Element Law, QWDE = Wide Interpretation, QWDST = Widest Interpretation. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table A6. Correlation between low-income housing production and the quality measures.






2 QNRW −0.09 —–
3 QWDE −0.12 0.95 * —–
4 QWDST −0.13 0.91 * 0.98 * —–
Notes: * p < 0.05. QNRW = Narrow Quality. QWDE = Wide Quality. QWDST = Widest Quality.
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Figure A1. Annual compliance of California and the sample cities. The period of study is from 1998 to
2005. source: [117].
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